Edge Computing
Modeled edge safety gates and telemetry control boundaries, without physical actuation.
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Apex-Kinetic / SYSTEM MAP
SYSTEMS DESIGN & OWNERSHIP
The Rust SafetyController models who can command motion, the order of commands within an authority generation and whether the watchdog is fresh. A valid controller identity alone does not make an old motion command safe to execute.
Monotonic command ordering prevents delayed motion from overwriting a newer stop. Equal-timestamp retries are accepted only when the facts are identical; contradictory payloads fail. A new authority generation explicitly resets the ordering boundary.
Rust data and vision components, Python asyncio orchestration and streaming/infrastructure code define different execution roles. The public simulation tests the pure safety gate without opening device handles; deployed Kafka, Kubernetes and physical actuation are separate verification work.
EXPLORE THE ARCHITECTURE
Independent telemetry and video paths. Python emits modeled sensor samples; it is not connected to Rust hardware drivers. Motor authority is a software model, not verified physical actuation.
Exercise asynchronous sensor event publication.
ImplementationPython generates fixed IMU and proximity samples once per second and selects separate Kafka topics.
Security & failure behaviorSynthetic values are identified as modeled; the application does not establish a hardware control channel. Producer start/publish exceptions propagate; finally closes the publisher after loop failures.
TradeoffDeterministic samples support local experiments but do not demonstrate real sensor acquisition.
Await broker acknowledgment for telemetry messages.
ImplementationAIOKafkaProducer.start and send_and_wait publish UTF-8 payloads.
Security & failure behaviorThis adapter only supplies bootstrap_servers; TLS/SASL settings are not configured in this source. Broker errors propagate to the event loop; no durable local outbox appears here.
TradeoffSmall adapter; deployment manifests alone do not prove end-to-end communication security.
Forward validated camera media to a downstream TLS receiver.
ImplementationRTSP session parsing feeds forward_one_with_ack over a rustls client-authenticated connection; health events record stage outcomes.
Security & failure behaviorCertificate roots, client credentials and target hostname validate the downstream connection. Connection/handshake timeouts and bounded camera retry failures stop the run; downstream failures are surfaced.
TradeoffReal bridge code exists; camera/NVR interoperability still needs target-specific verification.
Accept framed media from authenticated clients.
ImplementationReceiver mode loads server credentials/client CA and persists accepted media to configured output.
Security & failure behaviorClient certificate authentication protects the receiver; filesystem permissions remain deployment responsibilities. Invalid TLS, framing or output writes return errors.
TradeoffA custom receiver is not evidence that a commercial NVR accepts this protocol.
Compute stop-or-drive decisions with explicit authority.
ImplementationGeneration, command age, controller connection, voltage and distance determine MotorDecision.
Security & failure behaviorMissing authority or sensor input yields zero speed. The modeled main runtime has no connected controller/voltage adapter. Lost control, stale commands, low power or obstacles return named stop reasons.
TradeoffSoftware decision logic requires a future physical adapter and hardware safety validation.
TECHNICAL CASE STUDY
Coordinate modeled edge motion and telemetry while preventing stale control messages from reviving superseded motion.
Authority generations, watchdog expiry, obstacle interlocks, bounded command validation, and safe test execution without hardware adapters.
Rust data plane and vision node, Python asyncio control plane, Kafka integration code and infrastructure manifests. Physical hardware and deployed Kafka/Kubernetes are not established by this demonstration.
The pure safety gate separates controller authority from execution. A controller generation is distinct from command ordering within that generation. The demo creates no network or device handles.
Reviewed history contains 18 charlesderek and 3 CharlesDerek commits. Custom safety and control implementations are the original scope; external device libraries and platform components retain their authorship.
The tested SafetyController models command authority, watchdog freshness, voltage/proximity conditions and stop decisions. Five fixture steps expose actual model outputs.
Hardware abstraction is modeled. Physical board behavior, real robotic actuation, deployed infrastructure and production streaming performance are unverified.
Older timestamps and changed commands at equal timestamps are rejected. Identical retries remain valid. A new authority generation resets ordering. Obstacle and expired watchdog inputs yield stop outputs.
12 scoped data-plane tests passed; fmt, strict Clippy and build passed. Two added tests failed at baseline because a delayed command overwrote a newer stop.
Before: reordered motion could replace a newer stop within one authority generation. After: monotonic command ordering and equal-timestamp collision fencing preserve stop. Local commit 7fe29f0.
Independent control/data/vision components with infrastructure manifests. This portfolio uses the pure model replay, never the hardware runtime.
Accept identical retries for idempotency; reject contradictory facts at the same timestamp. Authority generation changes explicitly reset ordering instead of accepting stale control implicitly.
The Edge safety replay exports actual decisions for authorization, delayed motion, obstacle interlock, watchdog expiry and old authority rejection. No real actuation or hardware integration is tested.
ENGINEERING SCOPE
Original Rust/Python implementation scope reviewed in local history; physical hardware and vendor primitives excluded.